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Abstract. Using panel data from 1980 to 2010 on 34 sub-Saharan African countries, this paper 
examines whether institutionalised authority, which is a proxy for state authority, can change the 
negative relationship between natural resources and economic growth. The key finding is that, 
institutionalised authority can alter the negative relationship that exists between natural resources 
and economic growth.  We also model the relationship between the oil revenue (fuel exports) and 
economic growth, and how institutionalised authority can alter this relationship as well. 
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Section 1: Introduction: 
Many research papers have been written in order to analyse the effect of natural resources on 
economic growth. These researches have used aggregate natural resources and in many cases, 
primary exports as a proxy for natural resources in doing this analysis. This paper seeks to 
decompose the natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa and make use of two main resources; ores 
and metal exports, and fuel exports. This research uses data from 1980 to 2010 on all the 48 sub-
Saharan Africa countries as recognized by the World Bank and the United nations. Any sub-
Saharan Africa that is not included in this research is either not recognized by the aforementioned 
bodies above or came into existence after 2010, like South Sudan. 
The effect of energy resource in the countries with abundant natural resources will be analysed in 
this paper. This is to see if the energy resources worsen the seemingly negative relationship 
between natural resource and economic growth or they reduce the negativity. Then more crucially 
in this paper, we will analyse the effect of institutionalised authority (a proxy for freedom or state 
authority) in all these relationships. In doing this, there will be an international perspective where 
a theoretical overview will be done on the effect of natural resources on the economic growth of 
countries outside the Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) region.  This is to see if the natural resource curse 
and the Dutch disease are worse or peculiar in the SSA countries are or it is same or even worse 
on the broader international perspective. 
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Section 2: The contribution of this paper 
First of all, this research seeks to establish and analyse the impact institutionalised authority has 
on the relationship between natural resources and economic growth of sub-Saharan African 
countries. In establishing that the resource curse is well and prevalent in the sub-Saharan region, 
this paper also examines the effect of oil revenue on economic growth in the sub region. After the 
analysis, it can be established that, the Dutch disease is indeed also present in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This means that, the oil revenue is an enforcer of the negative relationship between natural resource 
and economic growth (referred to as the natural resource curse). It will become clear at the end of 
this paper that, institutionalised authority can positively alter the role natural resources play in 
economic growth of sub-Saharan African countries. 
In establishing the regression model to use in order to analyse the relationship among growth, 
natural resource and institutionalised democracy, this paper makes use of the linear growth 
regression model which has become the standard empirical literature on this subject as used by 
researchers like Mankiw, Romer, et al (1992), Sachs and Warner (1997), Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003), and Ilmi (2007). Therefore, the empirical linear growth models that will be 
used in this paper consist of two sets of equations. The first set look at the relationship between 
natural resources and economic growth, and how institutionalised authority affect this relationship. 
The second set of models look at the relationship between the oil revenue (fuel exports) and 
economic growth, and how institutionalised authority can alter this relationship as well. The 
expectations from these set of models is that, natural resources have negative impact on economic 
growth, but institutionalised authority can positively affect this negative relationship. SSA 
countries have been mentioned uncountable number of times when discussions of the Dutch 
disease are done. Some researchers even hold the view that, SSA countries are the worst culprit 
caught in this menace. However, the role of freedom, institutionalised or state authority, in matters 
of resource management seems to be lacking in research. 
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In most SSA countries, many groups, in addition to the state, lay claim to the ownership and 
management of natural resources in their jurisdiction. There are countless number of rebel groups 
ranging from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the M23 (militia) in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo to the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in Nigeria. These 
militant groups believe that, they could better manage the natural resources than the state 
authorities who supposedly spend most of the revenue derived from these resources on 
bureaucracy and its unnecessary apparatus. 
This paper will look at the role that the state authority plays in the natural resource curse syndrome. 
This research seeks to analyse if the use of a united and institutionalised authority can alter this 
negative relationship which apparently exists between natural resources and economic growth. 
This paper is therefore, adding three main new dimensions to the existing literature on this matter; 
to check the severity of both the natural resource curse and the oil-induced Dutch disease on 
economic growth. We investigate if the inclusion of the oil resource reduces the negative impact 
of natural resources on economic growth or it worsens the natural resource curse. Then finally, 
this paper will look at the impact of institutionalised authority on the relationship between 
economic growth and natural resource, and also its effect on the relationship between economic 
growth and oil revenue. 
Many of these factors that have been empirically proven to be associated with the existence of the 
natural resource abundance and the Dutch disease is found in most SSA countries. Therefore, the 
countries with these factors that threaten economic growth are likely to have slow growth, with or 
without natural resource. Therefore, analyzing data on resource-rich (and oil-rich) countries in the 
SSA zone and their resource-poor counterparts also in the SSA zone and comparing the 
performance of their economic growth holding other factors constant will tell a better story than 
what has already been done. This paper will therefore pitch the growth rates of the SSA countries 
against each other. This means that, both sets of SSA countries will be taken into consideration; 
resource-rich and resource-poor ones. Using the same time period, from 1980 to 2010, we will see 
if the resource-poor ones are indeed performing better than the resource-rich ones.  
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Section 3: Data and software 
3.1 Data 
This paper makes use of data from two main sources; the World Bank, and the Center for Systemic 
Peace. However, in many instances, data is sought and crosscheck from the central bank, statistical 
offices, and other relevant institutions in these sub- Saharan African countries. The data on GDP 
growth, manufacturing growth, population growth, external debt, ores and metal exports (which is 
a representative of natural resources and herein after referred to as natural resources), fuel export, 
Life expectancy, and Tax Revenue, come from the World Bank.  However, polity (the proxy for 
freedom) comes from the Center for Systemic Peace. This center provides living data resources on 
167 countries that are independent and have population not less than 500,000 as at 2012. The terms 
oil, petroleum, and fuel exports shall be used loosely and shall mean the same thing. 
Throughout this paper, some few terms are used loosely and interchangeably. Polity, polity2, 
institutionalised authority, state authority, and central authority shall mean same and are used 
loosely and interchangeably. Economic growth, economic development and manufacturing growth 
shall mean same and are used loosely and interchangeably. Black gold, oil revenue, oil exports, 
energy resource, and fuel exports shall mean same and are also used loosely and interchangeably. 
GDP and economic growth are also used loosely and interchangeably as well. 
Data preparation sometimes referred to as data preprocessing is the process of manipulating data 
into a form suitable for further analysis and processing (Spector, 2008; Williams, 2011). It is one 
of the most important steps in data analysis that ensures data integrity and quality (Kalbfleisch & 
Prentice, 2011). The process is often described as tedious and time consuming because it involves 
several different tasks which often cannot be automated. Some of these tasks include editing, 
coding and tabulation. It could also involve dealing with cleaning, aggregation variables and 
records selection as well as transformation of data. 
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 In this study, the focus was on selecting variables that have major impact on economic 
growth specifically for the sub-Saharan Africa region. Some of these variables are population 
growth, external debts, tax revenue, fuel exports, life expectancy among others. Firstly, data were 
collected from the World Bank, institutions in the sub-Saharan African countries under 
consideration, and the center for systemic peace from 12th February to 14th March to construct the 
final data set. The data was then prepared to form a panel data from 1980 to 2010 and saved in a 
comma separated value (csv) format. A panel data also referred to as longitudinal or cross-sectional 
time-series data is one in which the behavior of entities are observed across time. These entities 
may be individuals, countries, regions or companies. The entities in this study were made of 49 
sub-Saharan African countries. 
3.2 Software  
The data preparation, cleaning, transformation and the analysis were all performed using the R 
programming language. R is free open source software with rich and comprehensive statistical and 
graphical programming packages (Maindonald, 2007; Ihaka & Gentleman, 1996). R is also unique 
as a statistical software tool because of its expansive sets of packages for solving almost all 
statistical problems. In this study, the following packages were handy in the preparation as well as 
the analysis stages.  
 car - Companion to Applied Regression 
 pastecs - Package for Analysis of Space-Time Ecological Series 
 plm - Linear Models for Panel Data 
 gdata - Various R programming tools for data manipulation 
 foreign - Read data stored by Minitab, dBase, SAS, SPSS, Stata,etc 
 lmtest - Testing Linear Regression Models 
 
The main package used was plm which was used in running both random and fixed effects on the 
data sets. The same package was also useful in deciding between whether to employ random or 
fixed effects on the models by running the Hausman test. 
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Section 4: Model 
4.1 Model equations 
The Resource Curse: Natural Resource, Institutionalised Authority, and Economic Growth 
The following regression seeks to estimate the relationship between the natural resources, 
institutionalised democracy, and economic growth of 34 Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Growthit= β0 + β1Natuit +  β2Popit + β3Lifeit  + β4Extit + β5Importsit + β6Educit + β7Polityit + β8Natuit 
× Polityit   + µit 
As a standard practice in using panel data, i refers to the countries while t relates to time. 
Growth relates to the manufacturing growth, which is a proxy for real non-oil GDP growth. 
Natu refers to natural resources. This is the aggregate of fuels, ores and metal exports. 
Pop refers to population growth which is the percentage of the rate of growth from the previous 
year to the current year. 
 Ext refers to external debts, which is a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI). 
Imports refer to imports of goods and services, a percentage of GDP.  
Educ refers to total public spending on education, a percentage of GDP. 
Life refers to life expectancy, the total number of years a person is expected to live if the current 
mortality conditions at the time of that person’s birth remain same throughout. 
Polity is the proxy for institutionalised democracy. 
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The interaction term between natural resource and institutionalised authority in the equation is to 
enable us address the core question this paper seeks to answer- does institutionalised authority 
affect the relationship between natural resource and economic growth, and how? 
Under this set of model, there are two other equations. The first one is to estimate an equation for 
the relationship between natural resource and economic growth, with the assumption of non-
existence of institutionalised democracy. Therefore, the polity variable was not included in this 
equation at all: 
Growthit= β0 + β1Natuit +  β2Popit + β3Lifeit  + β4Extit + β5Importsit + β6Educit + µit  
The second equation under this model is an equation that makes room for the existence of 
institutionalised democracy, but with no interaction between institutionalised authority and natural 
resource. 
Growthit= β0 + β1Natuit +  β2Popit + β3Lifeit  + β4Extit + β5Importsit + β6Educit + β7Polityit + µit 
This is to see the influence of natural resource on economic growth in countries with 
institutionalised authority but this resource is not fully managed by the institutionalised authority. 
Example is the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The Dutch Disease: Oil Revenue, Institutionalised Authority, and Economic Growth 
This is the second model which focuses on the oil resource, which is also a major resource on the 
sub-Saharan African sub region. 
Growthit= β0 + β1Oilit +  β2Popit + β3Lifeit  + β4Extit + β5Importsit + β6Educit + β7Polityit + β8Oilit × 
Polityit   + µit 
Oil refers to the oil resource, represented by fuel exports. All other variables in this equation remain 
same as explained in the first model for natural resource. There is an interaction term in this 
equation as well. This is also to answer the fundamental question of whether institutionalised 
authority can positively affect the relationship between the oil resource and economic growth. 
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In this model, there are two sub equations as well. The first equation is to estimate the relationship 
between oil resource and economic growth without including the institutionalised authority 
variable in the equation. This is to see how oil resource affects economic growth in sub-Saharan 
African countries that do not have institutionalised authority (not necessarily elections). 
Growthit= β0 + β1Oilit +  β2Popit + β3Lifeit  + β4Extit + β5Importsit + β6Educit + µit  
The second sub equation under this model is the equation estimating the relationship between the 
oil resource and economic growth, which includes institutionalised democracy, but no interaction 
between this variable and oil revenue. This is to see the influence of oil on economic growth in 
countries with institutionalised authority but where these resources are not totally managed by 
state authorities. 
Growthit= β0 + β1Oilit +  β2Popit + β3Lifeit  + β4Extit + β5Importsit + β6Educit + β7Polityit + µit 
4.2 Econometrics Issues 
In conducting this research on the 34 sub-Saharan African countries, this paper acknowledges that 
many limitations exist. The first and major problem in analyzing the relationship between natural 
resources and economic is the problem of reverse causality, that is, the issue of cause and effects. 
Thus, natural resources and institutionalised authority affect economic growth. However, these 
two factors could also be affected by the level of economic growth or development in a country. 
Example is the contrasting relationship between the effect of oil resource on economic growth in 
Norway and Nigeria. Many schools of thought believe that, if Nigeria’s level of economic growth 
was like that of Norway when both countries discovered oil, the impact of the oil resource could 
have been positive on the economy of Nigeria as well, just like Norway. 
The second problem to look out for is the problem of omitted variable bias. However, the Ramsey 
Resett test showed a p-value of 0.0002677. This means that the model do not have any serious 
omitted variable bias problem. 
There are other limitations which include but not limited to measurement error. The 
acknowledgement of this problem necessitated the inclusion of an error term in the models. 
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There is also likelihood of the problem of endogeneity, where explanatory variables might be 
correlated with the error. This problem is solved by using five years lagged values of the 
independent variables as instrumental variables. This ensures that the model avoids the problem 
of endogeneity since error terms are not correlated with the lag of independent variables. 
Therefore, the explanatory variables used in the regressions are five years lagged values. 
To make sure that this model does not suffer from heterogeneity problems, many assumptions 
were made. Three main estimation models are used; pooled OLS, Fixed Effect (FE), and Random 
Effect (RE) models. In formulating the equation for the panel data, this paper makes use of a 
constant term, α0 : 
Growthit= α0 + β1Natuit +  β2Popit + β3Lifeit  + β4Extit + β5Importsit + β6Educit + β7Polityit + β8Natuit 
× Polityit   + µit       (a) 
Including time and country effects in our model, we make use of pooled OLS and Random Effect 
models. In these models, µit = ci +dt +ψit 
Where ci is the country-specific effect, dt is the time effect, and the ψit is the white noise. 
Growthit= ρit + β1Natuit +  β2Popit + β3Lifeit  + β4Extit + β5Importsit + β6Educit + β7Polityit + β8Natuit 
× Polityit + ψit        (b) 
 
With time and country effects for the Fixed Effect model, ρit = α0 + ci + dt. 
Assumption Underlying the three models; pooled OLS, Random Effect, and Fixed Effect 
(Park, 2005) 
For the pooled OLS model, the assumption is that, the effects of the explanatory variables and the 
intercepts shall be same for all countries. 
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The Random Effect model works under the assumption that error variance structure (µit = ci +dt 
+ψit) is affected by time and country-specific effects. 
The Fixed Effect model on the other hand analyses the impact of the time and country-specific 
effects on the intercept. 
In summary, this paper makes use of all the three estimation models (pooled OLS, Random Effect, 
and Fixed Effect models). The hypothesis under consideration is that, there is a negative 
relationship between natural resources economic growth, but institutionalised authority can change 
the nature of this relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  12 
12 
 
Section 5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Results 
The key results from the panel data analysis of the relationship between natural resources and 
economic growth in sub-Saharan African countries are discussed here. The dependent variable is 
the manufacturing growth, which is a proxy for real non-oil GDP growth, and a good indicator of 
economic growth. At the heart of this research is how institutionalised authority can be used to 
change the negative relationship between natural resources and economic growth. The 
institutionalised authority is represented by polity2. This variable is the aggregate of two 
indicators; Institutionalised Democracy and Institutionalised Autocracy. Institutionalised 
Democracy index is an additive eleven-point scale which ranges from zero to ten (0 -10); the higher 
the index, the higher the level of Institutionalised democracy. The Institutionalised Autocracy is 
also an eleven-point additive scale ranging from zero to ten (0 -10); the higher this value, the 
severity of the institutionalised autocracy. The polity2 variable is therefore, the subtraction of the 
institutionalised autocracy index from that of the institutionalised democracy. This mathematical 
operation leaves the polity2 index in the range of positive ten (+10) and negatives ten (-10). A 
positive value for polity2 means there is Institutionalised democracy in that country at that time; 
and the higher the positive value, the stronger the Institutionalised democracy. In a similar vein, a 
negative value for polity2 implies that, there is institutionalised autocracy in that country at that 
particular point in time; a higher negative value means that country is strongly autocratic. 
Therefore, the institutionalised autocracy for a country with a value of negative ten is worse and 
severe than for a country with wild autocracy of say, negative one (Center for Systemic Peace, 
2013). 
From the regression outputs, the coefficient of natural resource is significant and negative for three 
equations in the pooled OLS regressions. However, the coefficient of the interactive term of natural 
resource and polity2 is significant and positive. This proves that, indeed there is resource curse in 
sub-Saharan Africa but with institutionalised authority, this curse can be converted into a blessing; 
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as shown in the regression (See Appendix B). To explain this in details, the impact of the polity2 
variable is very important in this research. So in answering the core question in this paper, a set of 
regressions is carried out to see if institutionalised authority can alter the negative relationship 
between natural resource and economic growth. First, the polity2 variable is included in the model 
without interacting it with any other variable. In this circumstance, the polity2 variable is negative 
and significant in all the estimation models. 
Table 4: Estimation Results, including polity2 variable but no interactive term 
Coefficients :     
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 5.9432186 1.6277207    3.6513 0.000275 *** 
Natural.resource -0.0367959 0.0076839 -4.7887 1.943e-06 *** 
Population.growth -1.4518097 0.1867099 -7.7758 1.923e-14 *** 
Life.expectancy.at.birth 0.1358164 0.0317226 4.2814 2.043e-05 *** 
External.Debt -0.0054900 0.0018129 -3.0284 0.002524 **  
Imports 0.0472989 0.0092087 5.1363 3.390e-07 *** 
Education 0.4838312 0.0709976 6.8148 1.663e-11 *** 
polity2 -0.2208250 0.0340650 -6.4825 1.439e-10 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.22507   Adj. R-Squared :  0.22321 
 
 This means that, institutionalised authority on its own have negative relationship on economic 
growth. This can be explained by the fact that, institutionalised authority comes with institutions, 
elections, transitions, and other forms of bureaucracies. As the cliché goes ‘democracy is very 
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expensive’. This implies that, institutionalised authority as a variable does not improve the 
economy. Again, the institutionalised authority can be an autocratic one. Even in this case where 
there is likely to be very little or no institutions, no elections, and less bureaucracy, autocracy is 
characterized by less limitations on executive power, and sheer display of profligate expenditure 
without due process. So it comes as no surprise that, institutionalised authority on its own has a 
negative relationship with economic growth. However, and more importantly, the interaction 
between polity2 and natural resource shows a positive and significant coefficient. 
Table 5: Estimation Results, including the interactive term 
Coefficients :     
 Estimate Std. Error  t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 3.7624627 1.6582243 2.2690 0.023491 *   
Natural.resource -0.0247770 0.0079162 -3.1299 0.001801 **  
Population.growth -1.4761727 0.1842325 -8.0126 3.236e-15 *** 
Life.expectancy.at.birth 0.1733871 0.0320958 5.4022 8.300e-08 *** 
External.Debt -0.0052699 0.0017887 -2.9461 0.003295 **  
Imports 0.0501735 0.0091001 5.5135 4.518e-08 *** 
Education 0.4756806 0.0700506 6.7905 1.953e-11 *** 
polity2 -0.3190944 0.0384419 -8.3007 3.478e-16 *** 
Natural.resource:polity2 0.0074580 0.0014171 5.2628 1.749e-07 *** 
  Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.24676    Adj. R-Squared :  0.24447  
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This means that, institutionalised authority can alter the relationship between natural resource and 
economic growth from negative to positive. Specifically, one additional unit of natural resource 
introduced into an economy reduces economic growth by 0.0248 units. However, with the 
interaction with polity2, natural resource has positive effect on economic growth and for one 
additional unit of natural resource into the economy, economic growth improves by an additional 
0.0075 units.  
The regression also shows the effects of other independent variables used in the model are in 
conformity with expectations as to how they affect economic growth. Population growth has 
negative effect on economic growth. As it has been one of the plights of sub-Saharan African 
countries, increase in population growth has ‘coincided’ with worsening economic fortunes. 
External debt also has negative impact on economic growth. As expatiated in the previous chapter, 
one of the major challenges facing sub-Saharan African countries is their high level of external 
debts and its associated consequences. However, public spending on education has positive effect 
on economic growth. Thus, expenditure on education is a good investment in the productivity of 
people and the economy at large. Spending on education therefore, has a positive relationship with 
economic growth. The higher the expenditure by governments on education, the better it is for the 
economy, as evident in the results in this paper.  
 
The Dutch Disease Hypothesis; is oil a minimizer or a multiplier? 
The negative relationship between natural resource and economic growth has become evident in 
the estimations used in this paper. To see how the fuel component also reacts to economic growth, 
the results also prove similar to that of the natural resource; as depicted in the table below. 
 Table 6: Estimation Results using Fuel Exports with the interactive term 
Coefficients :  
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 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 4.6814819 1.6466324 2.8431 0.004563 **  
Fuel.exports -0.0312563 0.0103794 -3.0114 0.002669 **  
Population.growth -1.5016667 0.1867825 -8.0397 2.631e-15 *** 
Life.expectancy.at.birth 0.1573258 0.0322780 4.8741 1.278e-06 *** 
External.Debt -0.0052404 0.0018087 -2.8973 0.003849 **  
Imports 0.0467792 0.0092152 5.0763 4.619e-07 *** 
Education 0.4827046 0.0708896 6.8092 1.726e-11 *** 
polity2 -0.2623366 0.0360403 -7.2790 6.983e-13 *** 
Fuel.exports:polity2 0.0046812 0.0018584 2.5190 0.011930 *   
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.2283        Adj. R-Squared :  0.22619  
  
 From the above estimates, it can be seen that the fuel exports has a negative relationship with 
economic growth. Specifically, an additional increase of one unit of fuel exports will cause 
economic growth to decline by 0.0313. Recall that, with the same conditions and variables, natural 
resource causes economic growth to decline by 0.0248. This means that, oil revenue causes more 
havoc to economic growth than the much broader group of natural resource. This paper can 
therefore, conclude that, oil revenue reinforces the resource curse syndrome.  
When fuel export is interacted with polity2, the impact on economic growth becomes positive. In 
actual terms, the economy grows by 0.0047 units per every additional increase in fuel exports. 
This means that, oil revenue can become a blessing when countries have good institutionalised 
authority.     
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5.2 Robustness 
Using the pooled OLS for empirical analysis, the assumption is that, the intercepts are the same 
for all the sub-Saharan African countries under consideration, and therefore all these countries 
shall react to changes in economic growth the same way. 
However, other assumptions are further made to control for unobservable heterogeneity and to 
ensure the robustness of the results. A different assumption here is that, changes to economic 
growth are not the same for all the sub-Saharan African countries. With this assumption, it 
becomes necessary to use Fixed Effect and Random Effect models. The main empirical findings 
are discussed below. 
To check if the resource curse syndrome really exists in sub-Saharan Africa, the regression models 
are done with and without the interactive term. The first two regressions are done without the 
interaction term. The first regressions completely exclude the polity2 variable. Under this 
circumstance, the coefficient of natural resource is negative for both estimation models, but it is 
only significant under the Fixed Effect model, and not significant in the Random Effect model. 
The second regression which includes the polity2 variable but with no interaction between this 
variable and the natural resource variable, the coefficient of natural resource is negative and 
significant in both estimation models. This outcome is in line with the resource curse syndrome; 
natural resource indeed has negative impact on economic growth. Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
resource-rich countries in sub-Saharan Africa are likely to have slower economic growth over a 
long period of time than their resource-poor counterparts. Finally, when the interactive term of 
polity2 and natural resource is included in these two models, the impact of natural resource is still 
negative, but with lower negativity in both models. For the Random Effect model, the coefficient 
reduces from 0.0343 to 0.0024. This means that, without polity2, one additional unit of natural 
resource introduced into an economy reduces the economic growth by 0.0343 units. However, with 
the interaction between natural resource and polity2, one additional unit of natural resource 
introduced into an economy reduces the economic growth by only 0.0024 units. It is obvious from 
this that, even though polity2 could not change the impact of the natural resource from negative to 
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positive on economic growth, it still has a very significant positive effect on natural resource’s 
impact on economic growth by reducing the negative impact drastically. The output from the Fixed 
Effect model also gave a similar result. Here, polity2 reduces the negative impact from 0.0338 
units to 0.0027 units.  Even though these two models gave very similar results, the Hausman test 
was done to find out which of these two models is better for this particular research 
The Hausman test 
This test is used to make a choice between Random Effect and Fixed Effect models. The null 
hypothesis for this test is that, Random Effect model is the preferred model. Whiles the alternate 
hypothesis is that, Fixed Effect is the preferred one.  After running this test, the p-value was 2.2e-
16 which is less than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and hence, Fixed Effect model 
becomes the preferred model. 
Also, to deal with heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems, this paper used robust 
covariance matrix to account for it. 
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Section 6: CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the hypothesis that natural resources have negative impact on economic 
growth. The influence of oil revenue is also analysed in this paper. It follows suit that oil revenue 
has negative impact on economic growth as well. What is new in this part is that, the negative 
impact of the oil revenue is more devastating than the broader group of natural resources. This 
indeed implies that, oil revenue is a maximiser in the natural resource curse syndrome. Data from 
1980 to 2010 on the 34 sub-Saharan African countries analysed in this paper showed that, 
institutionalised authority vested in the state, no matter how weak and inefficient it is, is better 
than having several groups attempting to be the right managers of these resources. 
It is worthy of note to acknowledge that, this research has some weaknesses. The data 
covers the period between 1980 and 2010 on 34 of the 48 sub-Saharan African countries. Data 
availability and reliability makes it difficult to include several years preceding the 1980s. This 
research concentrated on the linear relationship between natural resource and economic growth 
and how institutionalised authority can alter this relationship. Further research could be done to 
see the nonlinear relationship existing among these variables. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A 
List of Sample Countries 
 Country name Country 
Code 
 Country name Country 
code 
1 Benin BEN 18 Liberia LBR 
2 Botswana BWA 19 Madagascar MDG 
3 Burkina Faso BFA 20 Malawi MWI 
4 Burundi BDI 21 Mali MLI 
5 Cameroon CMR 22 Mauritania MRT 
6 Central African Republic CAF 23 Mauritius MUS 
7 Chad TCD 24 Niger NER 
8 Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR 25 Nigeria NGA 
9 Congo, Rep. COG 26 Rwanda RWA 
10 Cote d'Ivoire CIV 27 Senegal SEN 
11 Ethiopia ETH 28 Sierra Leone SLE 
12 Gabon GAB 29 South Africa ZAF 
13 Gambia, The GMB 30 Sudan SDN 
14 Ghana GHA 31 Swaziland SWZ 
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15 Guinea-Bissau GNB 32 Togo TGO 
16 Kenya KEN 33 Zambia ZMB 
17 Lesotho LSO 34 Zimbabwe ZWE 
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Appendix B 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
GDP growth 1053 3.22 7.37 -51.03 106.28 
Manufacturing growth 861 3.82 12.01 -54.01 177.72 
Manufacturing, value added 997 11.50 7.18 0.24 45.67 
Population growth 1054.00 2.60 1.15 -7.60 10.26 
Life expectancy 1054.00 52.13 6.77 26.76 72.97 
External debt 1021 97.22 114.58 2.16 1380.77 
Imports 1041 39.54 24.07 2.98 157.87 
Education 1054 1.94 2.95 0.00 44.33 
Polity2 1054 -1.19 6.15 -10.00 10.00 
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Appendix C 
Pooled OLS 
Table C1: Estimation using Natural resource with no polity2  
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 8.6002911 1.6084358 5.3470 1.117e-07 *** 
Natural.resource -0.0370985 0.0078456 -4.7286 2.598e-06 *** 
Population.growth -1.2921929 0.1889761 -6.8379 1.425e-11 *** 
Life.expectancy.at.birth 0.0860022 0.0314258 2.7367 0.006321 **  
External.Debt -0.0058123 0.0018503 -3.1412 0.001734 **  
Imports 0.0456162 0.0093989 4.8534 1.415e-06 *** 
Education 0.4219393 0.0718340 5.8738 5.859e-09 *** 
 Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.19125  Adj. R-Squared :  0.18987 
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Table C2: Estimation with polity2, without interaction term 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 5.9432186 1.6277207 3.6513 0.000275 *** 
Natural.resource -0.0367959 0.0076839 -4.7887 1.943e-06 *** 
Population.growth -1.4518097 0.1867099 -7.7758 1.923e-14 *** 
Life.expectancy.at.birth 0.1358164 0.0317226 4.2814 2.043e-05 *** 
External.Debt -0.0054900 0.0018129 -3.0284 0.002524 **  
Imports 0.0472989 0.0092087 5.1363 3.390e-07 *** 
Education 0.4838312 0.0709976 6.8148 1.663e-11 *** 
polity2 -0.2208250 0.0340650 -6.4825 1.439e-10 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.22507  Adj. R-Squared :  0.22321  
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Table C3: Estimate of natural resource with interactive term 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 3.7624627 1.6582243 2.2690 0.023491 *   
Natural.resource -0.0247770 0.0079162 -3.1299 0.001801 **  
Population.growth -1.4761727 0.1842325 -8.0126 3.236e-15 *** 
Life.expectancy.at.birth 0.1733871 0.0320958 5.4022 8.300e-08 *** 
External.Debt -0.0052699 0.0017887 -2.9461 0.003295 **  
Imports 0.0501735 0.0091001 5.5135 4.518e-08 *** 
Education 0.4756806 0.0700506 6.7905 1.953e-11 *** 
polity2 -0.3190944 0.0384419 -8.3007 3.478e-16 *** 
Natural.resource:polity2 0.0074580 0.0014171 5.2628 1.749e-07 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.24676   Adj. R-Squared :  0.24447 
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Random Effect (RE) Model Estimations 
 
Table C4: Estimation using Natural resource with no polity2 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 15.1217424 1.6268112 9.2953 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Natural.resource -0.0306350 0.0045818 -6.6863 3.871e-11 *** 
Population.growth -0.2849655 0.1033724 -2.7567 0.005949 **  
Life.expectancy.at.birth -0.0435879 0.0264384 -1.6487 0.099544 .   
External.Debt 0.0021229 0.0012455 1.7045 0.088615 .   
Imports -0.0186442 0.0084072 -2.2176 0.026812 *   
Education 0.1455668 0.0349873 4.1606 3.458e-05 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.088085   Adj. R-Squared :  0.08745 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  38 
38 
 
Table C5: Estimations using Natural resource with polity2, but no interactive term 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 13.8236775 1.6137300 8.5663 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Natural.resource -0.0278906 0.0046028 -6.0594 1.958e-09 *** 
Population.growth -0.3161258 0.1029521 -3.0706 0.002196 **  
Life.expectancy.at.birth -0.0264744 0.0265449 -0.9973 0.318847     
External.Debt 0.0027124 0.0012461 2.1766 0.029752 *   
Imports -0.0123273 0.0084631 -1.4566 0.145554     
Education 0.1650594 0.0350740 4.7060 2.896e-06 *** 
polity2 -0.0843093 0.0200896 -4.1967 2.959e-05 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.10434   Adj. R-Squared :  0.10348 
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Table C6: Estimations using Natural resource with the interactive term 
Coefficients : 
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 13.65428199 1.50712381 9.0598 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Natural.resource -0.03426705 0.00500422 -6.8476 1.337e-11 *** 
Population.growth -0.34790130 0.10420003 -3.3388 0.0008738 *** 
Life.expectancy.at.birth -0.02126279 0.02670905 -0.7961 0.4261764     
External.Debt 0.00253132 0.00125651 2.0146 0.0442276 *   
Imports -0.01015775 0.00848390 -1.1973 0.2314857     
Education 0.16660554 0.03558663 4.6817 3.253e-06 *** 
polity2 -0.05547663 0.02246981 -2.4689 0.0137242 *   
Natural.resource:polity2 -0.00244858 0.00075552 -3.2409 0.0012323 ** 
 Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.11371   Adj. R-Squared :  0.11265 
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Fixed Effect (FE) Models 
 
Table C7: Estimation using Natural resource with no polity2 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
Natural.resource -0.0300044 0.0045597 -6.5804 7.822e-11 *** 
Population.growth -0.2570960 0.1029336 -2.4977 0.012672 *   
Life.expectancy.at.birth -0.0499185 0.0265094 -1.8830 0.060005 .   
External.Debt 0.0024249 0.0012451 1.9476 0.051768 .   
Imports -0.0223740 0.0084651 -2.6431 0.008353 **  
Education 0.1404103 0.0347326 4.0426 5.723e-05 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.089684    Adj. R-Squared :  0.08599 
Source: Author’s computations 
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Table C8: Estimations using Natural resource with polity2, but no interactive term 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
Natural.resource -0.0272569 0.0045721 -5.9615 3.545e-09 *** 
Population.growth -0.2836600 0.1022917 -2.7730 0.005664 **  
Life.expectancy.at.birth -0.0341524 0.0265741 -1.2852 0.199051     
External.Debt 0.0030433 0.0012441 2.4461 0.014625 *   
Imports -0.0164377 0.0085209 -1.9291 0.054021 .   
Education 0.1585705 0.0347334 4.5654 5.656e-06 *** 
polity2 -0.0812560 0.0199597 -4.0710 5.079e-05 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.10562        Adj. R-Squared :  0.10116 
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Table C9: Estimations using Natural resource with the interactive term 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
Natural.resource -0.0337520 0.0048836 -6.9114 8.910e-12 *** 
Population.growth -0.2940257 0.1016715 -2.8919 0.0039183 **  
Life.expectancy.at.birth -0.0336551 0.0264029 -1.2747 0.2027431     
External.Debt 0.0031156 0.0012362 2.5202 0.0118965 *   
Imports -0.0171091 0.0084679 -2.0205 0.0436217 *   
Education 0.1549494 0.0345236 4.4882 8.083e-06 *** 
polity2 -0.0476157 0.0218969 -2.1745 0.0299163 *   
Natural.resource:polity2 -0.0026593 0.0007340 -3.6230 0.0003069 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.11808        Adj. R-Squared :  0.11298  
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Appendix D 
Fuel Exports Estimations 
Pooled OLS 
Table D1: Estimation using Fuel Exports with no polity2 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 8.1356463 1.6156636 5.0355 5.687e-07 *** 
Fuel.exports -0.0379806 0.0095778 -3.9655 7.866e-05 *** 
Population.growth -1.3141608 0.1898012 -6.9239 8.015e-12 *** 
Life.expectancy.at.birth 0.0909979 0.0317370 2.8673 0.004231 **  
External.Debt -0.0055929 0.0018553 -3.0146 0.002641 **  
Imports 0.0453017 0.0094535 4.7920 1.911e-06 *** 
Education 0.4228059 0.0721259 5.8621 6.274e-09 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.18578   Adj. R-Squared :  0.18444 
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Table D2: Estimation using Fuel Exports with polity2, but no interactive term 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 5.2948954 1.6330401 3.2424 0.001226 **  
Fuel.exports -0.0425658 0.0093841 -4.5360 6.457e-06 *** 
Population.growth -1.4868904 0.1872078 -7.9425 5.505e-15 *** 
Life.expectancy.at.birth 0.1458277 0.0320422 4.5511 6.018e-06 *** 
External.Debt -0.0052758 0.0018137 -2.9089 0.003710 **  
Imports 0.0465432 0.0092402 5.0370 5.644e-07 *** 
Education 0.4852676 0.0710787 6.8272 1.531e-11 *** 
polity2 -0.2329403 0.0341932 -6.8125 1.688e-11 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.22321  Adj. R-Squared :  0.22137 
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Table D3: Estimation using Fuel Exports with the interactive term 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 4.6814819 1.6466324 2.8431 0.004563 **  
Fuel.exports -0.0312563 0.0103794 -3.0114 0.002669 **  
Population.growth -1.5016667 0.1867825 -8.0397 2.631e-15 *** 
Life.expectancy.at.birth 0.1573258 0.0322780 4.8741 1.278e-06 *** 
External.Debt -0.0052404 0.0018087 -2.8973 0.003849 **  
Imports 0.0467792 0.0092152 5.0763 4.619e-07 *** 
Education 0.4827046 0.0708896 6.8092 1.726e-11 *** 
polity2 -0.2623366 0.0360403 -7.2790 6.983e-13 *** 
Fuel.exports:polity2 0.0046812 0.0018584 2.5190 0.011930 *   
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.2283        Adj. R-Squared :  0.22619  
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Random Effect (RE) Model Estimations 
Table D4: Estimation using Fuel Exports with no polity2 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 15.0197102 1.6500878 9.1024 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Fuel.exports -0.0053337 0.0060443 -0.8824 0.377756     
Population.growth -0.2444216 0.1057599 -2.3111 0.021038 *   
Life.expectancy.at.birth -0.0534683 0.0270291 -1.9782 0.048193 *   
External.Debt 0.0036318 0.0012539 2.8965 0.003859 **  
Imports -0.0199145 0.0086028 -2.3149 0.020828 *   
Education 0.1447215 0.0358337 4.0387 5.802e-05 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.046521      Adj. R-Squared :  0.046186  
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Table D5: Estimation using Fuel Exports with polity2, but no interactive term 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 13.4652405 1.6266818 8.2777 4.160e-16 *** 
Fuel.exports -0.0037042 0.0059983 -0.6175 0.5370223     
Population.growth -0.2856604 0.1050403 -2.7195 0.0066551 **  
Life.expectancy.at.birth -0.0319359 0.0270685 -1.1798 0.2383643     
External.Debt 0.0041857 0.0012473 3.3557 0.0008226 *** 
Imports -0.0121858 0.0086302 -1.4120 0.1582739     
Education 0.1681960 0.0358039 4.6977 3.013e-06 *** 
polity2 -0.1015209 0.0203161 -4.9971 6.912e-07 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.070513      Adj. R-Squared :  0.069932 
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Table D6: Estimation using Fuel Exports with the interactive term 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 13.38538534 1.60848921 8.3217 2.949e-16 *** 
Fuel.exports -0.00100359 0.00669289 -0.1499 0.880837     
Population.growth -0.28855612 0.10527630 -2.7409 0.006240 **  
Life.expectancy.at.birth -0.03068656 0.02711501 -1.1317 0.258035     
External.Debt 0.00414727 0.00124964 3.3188 0.000938 *** 
Imports -0.01189281 0.00863918 -1.3766 0.168952     
Education 0.16845202 0.03589753 4.6926 3.089e-06 *** 
polity2 -0.10743694 0.02119989 -5.0678 4.825e-07 *** 
Fuel.exports:polity2 0.00090348 0.00094647 0.9546 0.340027     
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.071356        Adj. R-Squared :  0.070695 
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Fixed Effect (FE) Model Estimations 
Table D7: Estimation using Fuel Exports without polity2 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
Fuel.exports -0.0042420 0.0060143 -0.7053 0.4807858     
Population.growth -0.2139024 0.1052113 -2.0331 0.0423283 *   
Life.expectancy.at.birth -0.0602573 0.0270856 -2.2247 0.0263405 *   
External.Debt 0.0039594 0.0012520 3.1625 0.0016148 **  
Imports -0.0240315 0.0086600 -2.7750 0.0056308 **  
Education 0.1388355 0.0355389 3.9066 0.0001004 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.047854        Adj. R-Squared :  0.045883 
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Table D8: Estimation using Fuel Exports with polity2, but no interactive term 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
Fuel.exports -0.0024781 0.0059529 -0.4163 0.6773001     
Population.growth -0.2494271 0.1042007 -2.3937 0.0168759 *   
Life.expectancy.at.birth -0.0403124 0.0270703 -1.4892 0.1367804     
External.Debt 0.0045561 0.0012430 3.6655 0.0002608 *** 
Imports -0.0167443 0.0086853 -1.9279 0.0541721 .   
Education 0.1607307 0.0353971 4.5408 6.341e-06 *** 
polity2 -0.0983112 0.0201500 -4.8790 1.254e-06 *** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.071617      Adj. R-Squared :  0.068593 
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Table D9: Estimation using Fuel Exports with the interactive term 
Coefficients :  
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)     
Fuel.exports 0.00028983 0.00662849 0.0437 0.9651329     
Population.growth -0.24901654 0.10420710 -2.3896 0.0170638 *   
Life.expectancy.at.birth -0.03986149 0.02707590 -1.4722 0.1413021     
External.Debt 0.00455022 0.00124304 3.6606 0.0002659 *** 
Imports -0.01685774 0.00868653 -1.9407 0.0525999 .   
Education 0.16032855 0.03540150 4.5289 6.702e-06 *** 
polity2 -0.10383482 0.02097377 -4.9507 8.780e-07 *** 
Fuel.exports:polity2 0.00088622 0.00093324 0.9496 0.3425561     
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
R-Squared      :  0.072517        Adj. R-Squared :  0.06938 
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Table D10: Fixed Effects Using Least Squares Dummy Variable Model 
Estimation using natural resource with interactive term 
Coefficients:  
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
Natural.resource -0.033752 0.004884 -6.911 8.91e-12 *** 
Population.growth -0.294026 0.101671 -2.892 0.003918 **  
Life.expectancy.at.birth -0.033655 0.026403 -1.275 0.202743     
External.Debt 0.003116 0.001236 2.520 0.011896 *   
Imports -0.017109 0.008468 -2.020 0.043622 *   
Education 0.154949 0.034524 4.488 8.08e-06 *** 
polity2 -0.047616 0.021897 -2.175 0.029916 *   
Natural.resource:polity2 -0.002659 0.000734 -3.623 0.000307*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  53 
53 
 
Table D11: Hausman Test 
 Hausman Test 
data:  Growth ~ Natural.resource + Population.growth + Life.expectancy.at.birth +  ... 
chisq = 181.0171, df = 8, p-value < 2.2e-16 
alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent 
Since the p-value is less than 0.05, we choose fixed effect 
  
 
Table D12:  F test (fixed.time, fixed) 
 
 F test for individual effects 
data:  Growth ~ Natural.resource + Population.growth + Life.expectancy.at.birth +  ... 
F = 3.1516, df1 = 30, df2 = 899, p-value = 4.189e-08 
alternative hypothesis: significant effects 
Since p-value is less than 0.05, time.fixed effect is the preferred model 
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Table D13:  The Breusch-Pagan LM test (fixed.time, fixed) 
 Lagrange Multiplier Test - time effects (Breusch-Pagan) 
data:  Growth ~ Natural.resource + Population.growth + Life.expectancy.at.birth +  ... 
chisq = 5.1395, df = 1, p-value = 0.02339 
alternative hypothesis: significant effects 
Since this number is less than 0.05, again the time.fixed effect model is the preferred 
  
 
 
Table D14: Test for Heteroskedasticity 
 Breusch-Pagan test 
data:  Growth ~ Natural.resource + Population.growth + Life.expectancy.at.birth +     
External.Debt + Imports + Education + polity2 + (polity2 *     Natural.resource) + 
factor(Country.Name) 
BP = 1041.651, df = 41, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Since the p-value is less than 0.05, there is heteroskedasticity 
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Table D15:  Controlling for heteroskedasticity: Random Effects 
Heteroskedasticity consistent coefficients 
 
t test of coefficients: 
     Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) 10.4950159 3.7922538 2.7675 0.005761 **  
Natural.resource -0.0250740 0.0185740 -1.3499 0.177360     
Population.growth -0.5281812 0.2229125 -2.3695 0.018017 *   
Life.expectancy.at.birth 0.0225955 0.0783906 0.2882 0.773225     
External.Debt -0.0002750 0.0019423 -0.1416 0.887440     
Imports 0.0109746 0.0134128 0.8182 0.413443     
Education 0.2101202 0.0472636 4.4457 9.814e-06 *** 
polity2 0.0171472 0.0574317 0.2986 0.765337     
Natural.resource:polity2 -0.0022039 0.0023206 -0.9497 0.342507 
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Table D14: The following shows the HC standard errors of the coefficients 
 
 (Intercept) Natural.resource Population.growth Life.expectancy.at.birth                     
HC0 3.792254 0.01857402 0.2229125 0.07839057  
HC1 3.870785 0.01895866 0.2275286 0.08001391 
HC2 3.878269 0.01899719 0.2339777 0.08047631  
HC3 3.966430 0.01943099 0.2458230 0.08264738    
HC4 3.889516 0.01907150 0.2571320 0.08185785        
           Natural.resource:polity2    External.Debt        Imports              Education 
HC0 0.002320603 0.001942302 0.01341279 0.04726358 
HC1 0.002368659 0.001982524 0.01369054 0.04824233 
HC2 0.002376919 0.001984615 0.01376611 0.05049254 
HC3 0.002434791 0.002028422 0.01413439 0.05484967 
HC4 0.002391668 0.001989044 0.01400623 0.06759935 
  
Note that the standard errors have reduced drastically after correcting for heteroskedasticity. 
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Table D15:  Controlling for heteroskedasticity: Fixed Effects 
Heteroskedasticity consistent coefficients 
 
t test of coefficients: 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
Natural.resource -0.02476543 0.01973551 -1.2549 0.209853     
Population.growth -0.46773936 0.20597945 -2.2708 0.023395 *   
Life.expectancy.at.birth 0.00797526 0.07814743 0.1021 0.918737     
External.Debt 0.00075126 0.00195794 0.3837 0.701290     
Imports 0.00165505 0.01473445 0.1123 0.910590     
Education 0.19315666 0.04353935 4.4364 1.028e-05*** 
polity2 0.03142987 0.05382239 0.5840 0.559397     
Natural.reosurce:polity2 -0.00254985 0.00246674 -1.0337 0.301558  
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Table D16: The following shows the HC standard errors of the coefficients 
 Natural.resource Population.growth Life.expectancy.at.birth                     Imports
HC0 0.01973551 0.2059794 0.07814743 0.01473445  
HC1 0.02013340 0.2101322 0.07972298 0.01503152 
HC2 0.02018670 0.2155877 0.08020953 0.01519001 
HC3 0.02064929 0.2258712 0.08235934 0.01566853    
HC4 0.02028246 0.2358599 0.08172691 0.01567253        
           Natural.resource:polity2       External.Debt                      Polity2 
HC0 0.002466740 0.001957937 0.05382239  
HC1 0.002516473 0.001997412 0.05490751  
HC2 0.002527140 0.002006146 0.05527323  
HC3 0.002589209 0.002056562 0.05681604  
HC4 0.002545451 0.002038845 0.05679317  
  
Note that the standard errors have reduced drastically after correcting for heteroskedacsticity. 
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Table D17:  Testing for unit roots/stationarity 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Dickey-Fuller = -9.8505, Lag order = 2, p-value = 0.01 
alternative hypothesis: stationary 
There is no unit root problem so the data used is stationary. The p-value is the same for all the 
variables 
 
